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The high food prices experienced over recent years have led to the widespread view that food price
volatility has increased. However, volatility has generally been lower over the two most recent dec-
ades than previously. Variability over the most recent period has been high but, with the important
exception of rice, not out of line with historical experience. There is weak evidence that grains price
volatility more generally may be increasing but it is too early to say.
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1. INTRODUCTION
World dollar prices of major agricultural food
commodities (‘food prices’ in what follows) rose
dramatically from late 2006 through to mid-2008.
Prices collapsed dramatically in the second half of
2008 with the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis. This episode
is often referred to as the ‘2008 price spike’. Prices
partially recovered in the second half of 2009 to
levels that generally exceed pre-spike values. Figure 1
shows (nominal) monthly prices for major grains and
oilseeds over the period 1990–2009.
A number of authors have discussed the factors that
lie behind the 2008 price spike (Abbot et al. 2008;
Mitchell 2008; Cooke & Robles 2009; Gilbert
2010a). A large number of potential explanations are
available. Those given greatest prominence are:
— rapid economic growth, particularly in China and
other Asian economies, emphasized by Gilbert
(2010a);
— decades of underinvestment in agriculture (World
Bank 2007);
— low inventory levels;
— poor harvests, in particular in Australia;
— depreciation of the US dollar, emphasized by
Abbot et al. (2008);
— diversion of food crops into the production of bio-
fuels, emphasized by Abbot et al. (2008) and
Mitchell (2008); and
— speculative inﬂuences, emphasized by Cooke &
Robles (2009) and Gilbert (2010a,b).
We do not join this debate. Instead, we ask whether
food prices have become more variable. Was the
2008 price spike a ‘one-off’ event without implications
for the longer term, or does it signal the initiation of a
more volatile period in which price spikes of this sort
will become more frequent occurrences? Previous
periods of high volatility have prompted the same
questions but the historical experience has generally
been that periods of high volatility have been relatively
short and interspaced with longer periods of market
tranquillity. It would therefore be wrong simply to
extrapolate recent and current high volatility levels
into the future. However, it remains valid to ask
whether part of the volatility rise may be permanent.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2
contains a historical review of food price volatility.
Section 3 looks at volatility determinants. Section 4
then considers the likely future evolution of food
price volatility while §5 considers the effects of
heightened volatility. Rice is discussed in §6 on the
basis that it differs in signiﬁcant ways from other
food commodities. Section 7 considers public policy
with the objective of moderating volatility or offsetting
its effects, and §8 concludes.
2. HISTORICAL REVIEW
Volatility is a directionless measure of the extent of the
variability of a price or quantity. It follows that vola-
tility measures derive from the second moment of
the distribution of the price or quantity in question,
or transformations thereof. Economists generally
focus on the standard deviation of logarithmic prices
since this is a unit-free measure. For low levels of vola-
tility, the log standard deviation is approximately equal
to the coefﬁcient of variation.
Economic series typically exhibit trends. Measure-
ment of volatility therefore requires the series to be
detrended since otherwise trend movements will be
included in the volatility measures. Because trends
are rarely linear and deterministic (Kim et al.2 0 0 3 ;
Kellard & Wohar 2006), detrending requires a trend
model that implies a judgemental trade-off between
attribution of variability to the trend itself and to vari-
ation about the trend. The volatility measure can
therefore depend on the choice of the trend model in
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economists often circumvent these issues by measuring
volatility as the standard deviation of price returns, i.e.
the standard deviation of changes in logarithmic prices.
We adopt this standard measurement convention.
Academic and policy analyses have tended to focus
on price levels rather than volatilities. An exception is
Gilbert (2006) who showed that agricultural price
volatility was low in the 1960s but was higher in the
1970s and the ﬁrst half of the 1980s. Volatility fell
back in the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s
but remained well above its 1960s level.
Table 1 updatestable4 of Gilbert (2006) looking from
1970 to 2009. The sample is divided at the end of 1989,
which is the half-way point in the sample. The ﬁrst
column of the table reports the volatility estimate for the
commodity over the entire 40 year period. The second
column gives the estimates for 1970–1989 and 1990–
2009. The third column reports the standard F-test for
variance equality. The test outcome is summarized in
the ﬁnal column. Figure 2 shows the same ﬁgures graphi-
cally, with the commodities ordered by the extent to
which volatility increased between the two periods.
From the ﬁrst column of table 1, we see that agri-
cultural volatilities have been lowest for grains and
meats and highest for fresh fruit. Fruit is perishable
and storage, which can limit volatility, plays a more
limited role for fruits than for the other commodities
considered in the table—see the discussion in §3. Col-
umns 2–4 of table 1 show that there was a statistically
signiﬁcant rise in volatility for only two commodities—
bananas and rice. By contrast, nine commodities
saw statistically signiﬁcant falls in volatility—cocoa,
soya beans, sugar, three vegetable oils (soya bean,
groundnut and palm) and the three meat and ﬁsh pro-
ducts (beef, lamb and ﬁshmeal). Overall, therefore, the
most recent two decades have seen lower levels of
agricultural volatility than in those of the 1970s and
1980s, with rice constituting the main exception to
this tendency. These ﬁndings are in line with those
of Balcombe (2009) who also failed to ﬁnd evidence
of any general increase in volatilities.
In splitting the sample at the end of the 1980s, the
tests reported in table 1 provide a relatively crude indi-
cation of whether volatilities have been changing. It is
arguable that it is the high volatility levels of the most
recent years that are out of line with past experience.
This is difﬁcult to judge because volatility itself is
highly variable over time. Furthermore, periods of
high volatility tend to bunch. One way of posing the
question in relation to recent levels of volatility is to
estimate a volatility model.
The generalized autoregressive conditional
heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model is now the stan-
dard procedure for modelling volatility in ﬁnancial
markets (Engle 1982; Bollerslev 1986). GARCH
speciﬁes an autoregressive moving average process
for the variance (scedastic) process followed by a
time series to yield an estimate of the conditional
variance of the process at each date in the sample. In
Gilbert & Morgan (2010), we use the ﬁrst-order
GARCH(1,1) framework to ask whether there was
an upward shift in the mean of the scedastic process
over the period 2007–2009. The question may be
paraphrased as asking whether the conditional vola-
tility of food prices was higher from 2006 or whether
we simply observed a number of high prices, leaving
expected volatility unchanged.
Results are summarized in table 2. They vary across
commodity groups. At the 5 per cent level, the mean of
the conditional volatility process only increased signiﬁ-
cantly for soya bean oil. (Bananas show a signiﬁcant
volatility decrease.) However, the estimated increase
in conditional volatility is positive for all ﬁve grains
and all ﬁve vegetable oils, and the increases are signiﬁ-
cant at the 10 per cent level for soya beans and
groundnut oil as well as for soya bean oil. There is
no systematic pattern in the change in conditional
volatility for the remaining nine food commodities.
To summarize, this analysis has generated two
conclusions:
— Agricultural price volatility was generally lower
over the past two decades than in the 1970s and
1980s, the major exception being rice.
— Although the prices of many food products exhi-
bited high variability over the 3 year periods
2007–2009, conditional variances increased
signiﬁcantly for groundnut oil, soya beans and
soya bean oil.
It follows that, although there has not been any
general tendency for food price volatility to increase
over the most recent years, volatilities of the most
important grains have increased. While this does
not imply that these volatilities will remain high, it
does underline concern that there is an increased
likelihood of further sharp price movements for these
products.
3. THE CAUSES OF FOOD PRICE VOLATILITY
Agricultural prices vary because production and
consumption are variable. Economists distinguish
between predictable and unpredictable variability, the
latter being characterized in terms of shocks. Shocks
to production and consumption transmit into price
variability. Production can vary either because of
variations in area planted or because of yield varia-
tions, typically owing to weather. Consumption varies
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Figure 1. Grains price index numbers (2005 ¼ 100), 1990–
2009. Dark grey line, wheat; brown line, maize; green line,
rice; red line, soya beans.
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substitutes and shifts in tastes. It is generally supposed
that the most important source of price variability in
agriculture is weather shocks to agricultural yields.
Nevertheless, demand shocks, in particular income
shocks (Gilbert 2010a) and policy shocks (Christiaensen
2009), may also play an important role.
The extent to which given production and
consumption shocks translate into price volatility dep-
ends on supply and demand elasticities, which, in
turn, reﬂect the responsiveness of producers and con-
sumers to changes in prices. It is generally agreed that
these elasticities are low over the short term, in par-
ticular within the crop year. Farmers cannot harvest
what they have not planted and will almost invariably
harvest everything that they have planted. Consumers
are reluctant to revise habitual dietary patterns and,
in poor countries, they may have few alternatives.
Furthermore, the commodity raw material may
comprise only a small component of many processed
Table 1. Price volatilities 1970–2009. Standard deviations of logarithmic changes in monthly average real US dollar prices at
an annual rate, January 1970–December 2009. Nominal prices are deﬂated by the US PPI (all items). p-values are given in
parentheses. Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, except coffee (International Coffee Organization).
1970–2009 1970–1989 1990–2009 equality test (p-value)
beverages plus sugar (%)
cocoa 23.1 24.8 21.1 1.38 (0.7) signiﬁcant fall
coffee 25.5 25.4 25.7 1.03 (42.6) insigniﬁcant rise
sugar 35.0 42.2 25.7 2.69 (,0.1) signiﬁcant fall
tea 27.1 27.6 26.5 1.08 (26.6) insigniﬁcant fall
grains (%)
maize (corn) 19.3 19.4 19.2 1.02 (44.2) insigniﬁcant fall
rice 21.1 18.9 23.3 1.52 (0.1) signiﬁcant rise
sorghum 20.4 20.2 20.6 1.05 (36.1) insigniﬁcant rise
soya beans 22.4 24.9 19.5 1.64 (,0.1) signiﬁcant fall
wheat 20.0 19.5 20.5 1.11 (21.2) insigniﬁcant rise
fats and oils (%)
coconut oil 32.4 30.9 34.0 1.21 (7.0) insigniﬁcant rise
groundnut oil 21.8 26.0 16.4 2.52 (,0.1) signiﬁcant fall
palm oil 28.2 30.4 25.8 1.40 (0.5) signiﬁcant fall
soya bean oil 22.8 25.9 19.2 1.83 (,0.1) signiﬁcant fall
sunﬂower oil 27.2 25.8 28.6 1.23 (5.8) insigniﬁcant rise
meats and ﬁsh (%)
beef 15.0 15.9 14.0 1.29 (2.4) signiﬁcant fall
lamb 15.3 17.4 12.7 1.88 (,0.1) signiﬁcant fall
ﬁshmeal 22.2 26.1 17.3 2.27 (,0.1) signiﬁcant fall
fresh fruit (%)
bananas 56.1 45.2 65.5 2.10 (,0.1) signiﬁcant rise
oranges 46.0 46.9 45.1 1.08 (27.6) insigniﬁcant fall
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Figure 2. Changes in volatility over time. Lavender coloured bars, 1970–1989; magenta bars, 1990–2009.
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price rises have a small impact on ﬁnal product prices.
Stockholding causes volatility to bunch. When
stocks are low, relatively small production or consump-
tion shocks can have large price impacts but when they
are high, the reverse is the case. Moreover, once stock
levels become high, they will remain high until con-
sumption has exceeded production for sufﬁcient time
to absorb past surpluses. Stockholding therefore
results in a cyclical pattern in prices and volatilities
even if supply and demand shocks are independent
over time. World grain stocks fell to low levels by
2006, and this is seen as one cause of recent high
grains price volatility. Since it takes time to rebuild
stocks, it is possible that volatility levels will remain
high over the next few years. But this does not imply
that volatilities will be permanently higher.
Otherfactorsmayalsobeimportantineitheramplify-
ing or attenuating volatility. Stockholding will reduce
volatility so long as stocks are accumulated in periods
of excess supply and released in times of excess
demand. However, stockholding is more effective in
reducing the extent of price falls in the event of positive
supply shocks (abundant harvests) than in reducing the
extent of price rises in the event of shortfalls since des-
tocking depends on the existence of a carryover from
previous years. Stockholding therefore reduces volatility
but also gives a positive skew to the price distribution
(Wright & Williams 1991; Deaton & Laroque 1992).
Speculation is a second factor that may have either a
positive or a negative impact on volatility. Speculation
may be either through stockholding or through
purchase and sale of commodity futures or other
derivative contracts. However, not all futures markets
transactions are speculative—the standard regulatory
distinction between hedging, in which supply chain
agents attempt to offset risk exposure through futures
transactions, and speculation is that speculators are
‘non-commercials’, i.e. they do not have any involve-
ment in the physical commodity trade. Commodity
futures markets are seen as providing a structure
in which risk is transferred from commercial to non-
commercial traders, i.e. from hedgers to speculators.
In assuming this price risk, speculators provide
the market liquidity that enables hedgers to ﬁnd
counterparties in a relatively costless manner.
By analogy with insurance markets, in aggregate,
speculators will expect to proﬁt and hedgers to pay
for this risk transfer. The traditional view among econ-
omists is that speculation will tend to be stabilizing
(i.e. volatility reducing) because destabilizing specu-
lation will be unproﬁtable and will therefore not
persist (Friedman 1953). However, much speculation
is undertaken by trend-following commodity trade
advisors or amateur traders, and there is a worry that
their extrapolatively based actions may result in self-
fulﬁlling beliefs—if identiﬁed as a nascent trend, a ran-
domly induced price rise will generate further buying,
thereby reinforcing the initial movement (De Long
et al. 1990; Irwin & Yoshimaru 1999; Irwin & Holt
2004; Gilbert 2010b).
More recently, a signiﬁcant group of institutional
investors have started to invest in commodity futures
through index-based swap transactions as a portfolio
diversiﬁcation strategy and to assume exposure to
the commodity ‘asset class’. In agricultural futures
markets, these positions are often large in relation to
total activity—up to 40 per cent of market open
interest (Gilbert 2010b). Differently from traditional
speculation, these positions are relatively long term
and are predominantly long, i.e. they involve purchase
of futures contracts, which are then held as long-term
investments. The sharp rise in index-based investment
in commodity futures over the past ﬁve years may
therefore be seen as a positive shock to inventory
demand. Gilbert (2010a) argues that this shock was
a signiﬁcant contributory factor to the 2007–2008
food price spike; see also US Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations (2009).
Food price volatility arises from shocks that can
come from a number of sources, with the impact
being felt differently in each separate commodity
market. On some occasions, these shocks will be corre-
lated. Often, this will be the case if common factors
simultaneously affect a range of different markets, per-
haps including non-agricultural markets. This appears
to have been the case in 2007–2008 when most agri-
cultural prices and many non-agricultural prices
(energy, metals and freight rates) rose simultaneously.
It was also the case in the 1973–1974 food price spike.
In such cases, it appears likely that there are common
causal factors. There is less agreement in the identity
of these causal factors but demand growth, high oil
prices perhaps generating demand for grains as
biofuel feedstocks, dollar depreciation and futures
market speculation are all candidates in this regard
(Cooper & Lawrence 1975; Baffes 2007; Abbot et al.
2008; Mitchell 2008; Gilbert 2010b).
4. CONSEQUENCES OF FOOD PRICE VOLATILITY
Our focus in this discussion is grains and, to a lesser
extent, vegetable oils since these are overall the most
important food crops. Grains are the major staple
Table 2. GARCH dummy variable coefﬁcients. The table reports the estimated t-statistic on a dummy variable with value 1
from January 2007 included in a GARCH(1,1) model for the price series over the period January 1990–December 2009
(240 observations). The ﬁrst-order (mean) process is MA(1). Statistically signiﬁcant t-statistics (at the 5% level and a
one-sided alternative) are shown in italic. See Gilbert & Morgan (2010) for further details.
cocoa 0.85 maize (corn) 0.44 coconut oil 0.18 bananas 22.07
coffee 21.17 rice 0.91 groundnut oil 1.94 oranges 20.69
sugar 0.88 sorghum 0.28 palm oil 1.46 beef 0.53
tea 0.90 soya beans 1.79 soya bean oil 2.16 lamb 21.36
wheat 1.66 sunﬂower oil 1.21 ﬁshmeal 21.08
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production of meat products. As such, they are key
within the food price volatility question. Within the
grains group, we can distinguish between:
— wheat, which is the most important grain in tem-
perate regions;
— maize, which is grown in both temperate and tropi-
cal zones; white maize is the major staple food in
eastern and southern Africa while yellow maize is
the major biofuel feedstock in the United States
and, increasingly, China;
— rice, which is the staple food through most of Asia
and is also important in Africa and Latin America;
and
— soya beans, which are important both as an animal
feedstock and, when crushed, as a vegetable oil.
Direct consumption of grains declines as societies
become richer. The consequence is that the impact
of high and volatile grain prices concentrates on the
poorer rather than the richer economies and on the
poor rather than the rich within each economy. In gen-
eral terms, it is probably correct to argue that, in the
richer developed economies such as Britain, energy
price volatility is more problematic than food price
volatility. Food price volatility therefore has a greater
impact on the developing world, where, depending
on the region, maize and rice are the most important
food staples. Meat consumption, by contrast, rises as
consumers become richer, at least at low and moderate
income levels, and this translates into a greater indirect
dependence on grains as animal feedstocks. The indir-
ect impact of grains price volatility through meat prices
is therefore most acute at middle levels of income.
The impact of food price volatility can be viewed at
both the economy level and at the individual (producer
and consumer) level, although the impact will depend
on which economy and which individuals are being
examined. Focusing on the economy level ﬁrst, there
are a number of key factors that will affect the way
food price volatility will create an impact. Virtually
all economies trade in food—as importers and/or
exporters—and thus volatility in world food prices
will potentially have trade bill effects, the net outcome
of which will depend on the country’s net food export
position and the extent to which it is integrated in world
markets. As such, it is unsurprising to note that a
country-by-country approach to evaluating the effect
of food price volatility would need to be carried out
before precise impacts could be measured and even
then, speciﬁc periods of time would have to be
identiﬁed over which the effects were to be measured.
However, it is possible to review some of the generic
outcomes alongside case studies of particular countries.
Importing, richer nations are concerned about food
price volatility in terms of the impact it might have on
consumer price inﬂation and, to a lesser extent, by bal-
ance of trade effects. As world commodity prices
generally rise, food prices included, domestic price
levels could rise with fears of price–wage spirals
being set off (Bloch et al. 2007). Mundlak & Larsen
(1992) explore the transmission of world prices to
domestic levels and the null hypothesis of the law of
one price rarely holds owing to many factors, not
least of which are impact of exchange rates and degrees
of imperfect competition within domestic supply
chains. It is possible to characterize richer nations as
being more open to world price effects given estab-
lished trading policies, which could suggest a greater
concern over volatility, but this is dampened by the
relatively low expenditure on food as a proportion of
national income. The same concerns arise with respect
to oil price volatility but pass-through has been low
over the most recent decade.
Looking at individuals in richer nations, consumers
of food, now largely in the form of processed food pro-
ducts, are affected to the extent that world agricultural
prices are transmitted into the prices paid for products
in retail outlets. Retail sectors are often imperfectly
competitive (Clarke et al. 2002) and thus pass-through
is often incomplete, dampening volatility effects. More
pertinent is the possible link to rising wage demands to
compensate for higher food prices, but this is now a
relatively weak link given the relatively low proportion
of household income spent on food (10–15% in
many countries is typical). Perhaps of some interest
is the relative impact on poorer consumers in rich
countries who do spend a higher proportion of
their income on food and thus who could potentially
suffer greater welfare loss from more volatile (higher)
prices. It is notable, however, that the high food
prices in 2007–2008 were much lower on the political
agenda in the rich countries, including Britain, than
the high energy and fuel prices.
Despite the inherent risks in agricultural production
(Moschini & Hennessy 2001), producers in many
richer nations may in principle cope with these risks
and the resulting food price volatility through a range
of different mechanisms such as forward and futures
markets and crop insurance. While these arrangements
do little to reduce price volatility, they do allow produ-
cers to cope more effectively with this volatility. As
such, food price volatility can bring some short-term
uncertainty, but in aggregate terms, the welfare impact
for producers in richer nations is relatively minor.
Many poorer nations are net importers of food pro-
ducts, either in raw or processed form. For these
countries, the proportion of the import bill that goes
on food is generally much higher than in richer
nations. Grains are the principal commodities of con-
cern, followed by vegetable oils. In Asia, food security
concerns relate primarily to the adequacy of rice
supplies. In southern and eastern Africa, white maize
plays this role. Because many food-importing
countries are landlocked, price volatility can be very
high—see Dana et al. (2006) in relation to maize in
Malawi and Zambia. The major use for soya beans is
in meat production, so volatility in soya bean prices
feeds through into meat prices. This factor is particu-
larly important in China, which is the major world
importer of soya beans.
Volatile world food prices can create major import
bill uncertainty with concomitant exchange rate
uncertainty. Scarce foreign exchange reserves can be
exhausted relatively quickly with a sudden spike in
food prices as the elasticity of demand for food
imports is relatively low. The Food and Agriculture
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2008) shows how increasing cereal import costs as a
percentage of GDP can lead to a signiﬁcant widening
of the current account deﬁcit in seven economies of
more than 3 per cent, while for another seven
countries, the anticipated increase is between 2 and
3 per cent (2006/2007–2007/2008).
Many developing country governments act to stabil-
ize the domestic prices of food staples in order to avoid
importing volatility from the world market. In most
cases, the countries will also be signiﬁcant producers
of the staple. Stabilization will then limit the incentive
for domestic farmers to respond to signals from the
world market. If a sufﬁcient number of countries act
in this way, the resulting reduction in the world
supply elasticity will exacerbate volatility. Where
countries are net importers, stabilization will require
ﬁscal resources. Food price volatility therefore
introduces volatility into government expenditure.
In the poorest nations, where poverty levels are high
and where food security becomes a pressing concern,
food price volatility can in extremis lead to great hard-
ship for consumers and even revolt (the 2008 riots in
Indonesia and Haiti, for example), reﬂecting the fact
that food expenditure constitutes a signiﬁcant pro-
portion of the total income (70–80% of income).
Large and sudden increases in prices or indeed, just
large increases alone, can ultimately cause hunger,
poor nutrition and illness if consumers are unable to
buy their staple needs. Equally, as with richer nations,
there are potentially inﬂationary effects in poorer
nations too. FAO (2008) shows the relationship
between consumer price index (CPI) increases and
food price increases for a number of countries, for
example, Egypt seeing CPI rise by 15.4 per cent
while food prices rose 24.6 per cent (January
2007–January 2008) and Haiti 10.3 and 14.2 per
cent, respectively, for the same period.
Clearly, such dramatic impacts on the population are
unpalatable for governments who often employ controls
on markets or subsidization of prices to mitigate the
effects. Controls can take a number of forms, but in
periods of very steeply rising prices, some governments
have sought to limit food shortages by banning exports
of staple products grown in their own country (e.g. rice
markets in Vietnam, Cambodia and Egypt). Others try
to stem the impact of higher prices by buying at the
world market and then selling on to the domestic
market at lower (subsidized) prices. The difﬁculty
with this policy is that the expense can cause great
stress on government ﬁnance as the difference between
world and domestic prices gets larger.
5. HOW FOOD PRICE VOLATILITY IS LIKELY
TO CHANGE IN THE FUTURE
The current concern is that food price volatility may
have increased over recent years and may increase
further in the future. It follows from the discussion
in §2 that an increase in price volatility must arise
from one or more of the following four factors:
— an increase in the variance of demand shocks;
— an increase in the variance of supply shocks;
— a decline in the elasticity of demand; and
— a decline in the elasticity of supply.
In §1, we listed a number of factors seen as contribu-
tory to food price developments over 2006–2008. In
asking whether these factors have had a long-term
effect on volatility levels, or whether instead their
impact is transient, it is useful to relate the factors to
the four categories listed above.
(a) Increased demand variability
Gilbert (2010b) emphasizes the role of demand factors
in the determination of food prices, and a number of
commentators have pointed to rapid economic
growth in China and elsewhere in Asia as the
common driver of commodity price changes in
energy and metals as well as for foods. If demand
growth is becoming more variable as it becomes
faster, this will also generate increased food price vola-
tility. At the time of writing, the global macroeconomic
outlook is highly uncertain and combines continuing
fast growth in the emerging economies with a stagnant
prospect in the developed economies. If the eventual
resolution of current global imbalances involves
further crises, these are likely to be reﬂected in greater
food price volatility.
The use of food crops as biofuel feedstocks also ﬁts
under the demand variability heading. Many comm-
entators have claimed that the demand for food
commodities, in particular corn, sugar and vegetable
oils, as biofuel feedstocks has increased the correlation
between agricultural prices and the oil price—see, in
particular, Mitchell (2008). This allows transmission
of oil price volatility to agricultural prices, in effect
increasing the variance of demand shocks. If one con-
cedes that oil price volatility has increased over time,
this could lead to increased food price volatility.
There has been no systematic study of the effect of bio-
fuel demand on food price volatility, as distinct from
the level of food prices. Scientiﬁc studies of the effects
of biofuel demand on food price levels fail to ﬁnd clear
evidence of an increased linkage between the oil price
and agricultural prices over recent years (Gilbert
2010a). This may be because biofuel production in
Europe and the United States has to date been
driven more by government mandate requirements
than by direct proﬁt considerations and has therefore
not been sensitive to changes in the oil price. This
may change as China becomes a major producer of
biofuels.
Index-based investment in commodity futures, dis-
cussed in §3 in relation to speculation, also relates to the
demand variability heading. Index investors purchase
long positions in commodity futures, generally via
swap transactions, and hold these for extended periods
of time. This may be regarded as a form of ‘virtual
storage’ in which the investors pay the market to
carry inventory on their behalf. The result is to add
an additional component to the demand equation
and hence also an additional source of demand varia-
bility with the implication that ﬁnancial market shocks
can be imported into food markets. Many commercial
traders argue that this is precisely what has happened
over recent years, with the consequence that price
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underlying developments in physical supply and
demand. Gilbert (2010a,b) conﬁrms the importance
of index-based futures investment in amplifying price
movements in 2008 but notes that these effects were
smaller in food markets than in energy and metals
markets, reﬂecting the lower involvement of index-
based investors in agricultural futures.
(b) Increased supply variability
Poor Australian wheat harvests in 2006 and 2007 and
a poor European 2007 harvest have been mentioned as
possible causes of the 2006–2008 food price spike.
However, these poor harvests were offset by good
harvests elsewhere in the world, notably Argentina,
Kazakhstan and Russia, and 2008 harvests were
good. Mitchell (2008) discounts poor harvests as a
major cause of the spike.
Looking to the future, there must be a concern that
global warming will increase the variance of agricultural
production. Theoretical models, e.g. Schlenker et al.
(2005) and FAO (2008), suggest damage to existing
cropping areas if temperatures rise. It is certainly poss-
ible to ﬁnd clear examples of speciﬁc crop–country
combinations where this is the case. These mainly
relate to production in relatively arid areas—grain pro-
duction in much of Australia, cattle in areas of Africa
bordering the Sahara and food production in South
Asia and southern Africa (World Bank 2009). It is
widely believed that global warming may result in
more extreme weather conditions, and this may
result in greater yield variability. We are not aware of
scientiﬁc discussion of this possibility. In any case,
there remains the question of the extent to which
increased yield variability in speciﬁc crops and
countries will generalize to the entire spectrum of
food prices.
(c) Lower demand elasticities
Demand can only respond to price developments if
food consumers face prices that are related to world
markets. This forces attention on the issue of food
transmission, i.e. the extent to which prices on world
markets are passed through to local prices. Price trans-
mission is generally high in developed countries but,
because the food commodity itself often only accounts
for a small share of the total value of the product—
transportation and marketing dominate—even quite
large changes in world prices only have small effects
on retail prices. Transmission is more variable in deve-
loping countries and is often hindered by high
transportation costs that can divorce local prices
from those on world markets (Conforti 2004).O v e r
time, greater market integration (‘globalization’) is
tending to diminish these barriers. On the other hand,
governments often respond to higher food prices by
raising subsidies. Irrespective of the wisdom of such
policies, they will diminish price responsiveness on the
part of consumers. This has been cited as a contribu-
tory factor for oil price volatility but has not generally
been regarded as important for food crops.
The traditional view of speculation as price stabiliz-
ing, discussed in §3, may also be seen as affecting
demand elasticities. By buying low and selling high,
proﬁtable speculation should reduce price variability.
It will do this more effectively as markets become
more liquid. There are three qualiﬁcations to these
arguments. First, the evidence is mixed that specu-
lation is generally proﬁtable (Edwards & Ma 1992,
pp. 472–476). Second, not all speculation corre-
sponds to this traditional view—see the discussion of
index-based investment in §5a. Third, even if specu-
lation does reduce variances at lower frequencies
(e.g. month-to-month variability), it also appears to
increase higher frequency variances (day-to-day and
intraday variability). The overall effects of futures
speculation are therefore more mixed than those
predicted by the simple traditional account.
(d) Lower supply elasticities
Grain inventories have fallen over the period since the
millennium, and this has been cited as a contributory
factor in the 2006–2008 price spike. That argument is
difﬁcult to sustain in a simple form since the decline in
inventory levels was slow and steady while the price
rise, in 2007 and the ﬁrst half of 2008, was sharp
and sudden. What is clearer is that low inventory
levels will have reduced the responsiveness of supply
to the demand shocks which we argued above are
seen as important in generating the price rise.
Demand and supply shocks are responsible for the
incidence of price changes while the level of inven-
tories determines the amplitude of the resulting price
movements.
Grain reserves have fallen to low levels for two
reasons. First, commercial users have sought to econ-
omize on inventory and have placed reliance on rapid
and ﬂexible delivery. Second, governments have
come to rely more on trade than food security inven-
tories to meet shortfalls in domestic availability. Both
developments have been driven by the awareness that
inventories are expensive to maintain. Commercial
reliance on suppliers and national reliance on trade
provide lower cost solutions to availability problems
so long as shocks are idiosyncratic. They will fail
when shocks are common. This was brought home
to governments in 2008 who found that reliance on
trade for food security objectives is likely to fail in
exactly those circumstances in which it is required.
The result is a move back to inventories both in the
commercial supply chain and at the governmental
level in relation to food security. Higher grain inven-
tory levels should ensure that future supply and
demand shocks are more easily absorbed.
Underinvestment in agriculture, cited in World Bank
(2007) and particularly acute in the developing
world, by contrast, cannot be addressed so rapidly. It
takes the form of poor agricultural infrastructure
(roads, warehousing, port facilities), undeveloped
rural credit, exhaustion of soil nutrients, often as the
result of poor farming practice, and lack of research
into new seed varieties (Thurow & Kilman 2009).
All of these factors limit the ability of developing
country farmers to respond to price incentives, and
this exacerbates price volatility.
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There is a ﬁnal factor, exchange rate variability, which
does not ﬁt easily into the four categories set out
above. Changes in exchange rates reallocate purchas-
ing power and price incentives across countries
without changing the overall food supply–demand
balance. Dollar depreciation raises prices to US produ-
cers and consumers but lowers prices to consumers
outside the dollar area. This is because the dollar
price of the commodity on world markets will rise as
the result of the depreciation, but by less than the
extent of the depreciation, implying a fall in say euro
and sterling prices (Ridler & Yandle 1972). Exchange
rate variability therefore contributes to the variability
of prices measured in dollar terms, but would vanish
if prices were measured in terms of an appropriately
weighted basket of currencies.
The overall scorecard is therefore mixed. Table 3
attempts a highly judgmental summary of the impact
of the various factors considered both on the incidence
and amplitude of the 2006–2008 price shock and on
likely important future price volatility.
6. RICE
Rice, which is the staple food in much of Asia and is
also widely imported and consumed in central and
west Africa and in the Caribbean, is an exception to
many of the general conclusions drawn above in
relation to food price volatility.
— Rice is not closely linked in terms of either pro-
duction or consumption with other major
grains—it is produced on different types of land
and largely in different countries, and, in the
main, is consumed by different groups of
consumers.
— Rice production and consumptions shocks are not
highly correlated with those in other grains.
— Rice is not currently traded on a liquid futures
market—futures markets exist in both Bangkok
and Chicago, but they attract relatively little
business.
The consequence of these differences is that there is
little transmission of price changes from other grains
to rice, or vice versa. Rice prices therefore tend to
follow their own peculiar path. Financial activity on
futures markets has little impact. Nevertheless, rice
prices did rise strongly in 2007–2008 and remain
high in 2009.
The rice story in 2007–2009 is peculiar and in
some sense pre-modern (Christiaensen 2009;
Timmer 2009). Rice differs from other food commod-
ities in that only a small proportion of world rice enters
into international trade (most major consumers are
also major producers), and that much rice which is
traded is bought or sold at contracted, and not free,
market prices. The free market is therefore residual
and has the potential to exhibit high volatility. There
were no signiﬁcant production or consumption
shocks in the rice market, which was in surplus
through the whole of 2007–2008. The initial price
rise came in October 2007 when the Indian Govern-
ment limited rice exports in order to offset the effects
of rising wheat prices of the cost of living index. Fears
that this might lead to a shortfall led to panic buying
by governments of poor rice-importing countries,
which drove up prices to unprecedented levels. Prices
fell back in July 2008 when the Japanese Government
agreed to sell rice from its World Trade Organization
(WTO) stockpile. In the end, no rice was sold, but
the offer was sufﬁcient to cool the market.
The international rice market is evidently highly
problematic as well as politically important—most of
the so-called food riots in 2007–2008 involved rice.
It is urgent and important that steps are taken to
avoid a repeat of this episode (Timmer 2010). In our
view, however, it would be an error to see the problems
affecting the rice market as generalizing to other grains
markets or to wider agricultural markets. Both the
sequence of events over 2007–2009 and the volatility
statistics in §2 underline that ‘rice is different’.
Whether or not rice price volatility increases or
declines over the coming years will depend on how
well the international community addresses the par-
ticular problems of that market, not on any general
tendency of volatility in general to increase or decline.
7. REVIEW OF MECHANISMS TO REDUCE FOOD
PRICE VOLATILITY
There have been many attempts to deal with the pro-
blems associated with price volatility. These can be
reviewed in terms of the time period of interest—the
short term and the longer term. Taking the short
term ﬁrst, this refers to an instant and short-term
response to increased volatility, often in conjunction
with rising price levels. Many developing and middle
income countries have sought to deal with signiﬁcant
price volatility either through export controls (as in
Southeast Asia in relation to rice) or through price
subsidies. The result is that shocks on the world
market are not transmitted to domestic consumers.
By insulating domestic producers and consumers
from what is often seen as ‘imported volatility’,
countries reduce demand and supply elasticities in
the world market. When a signiﬁcant number of
major producers of the commodity act in this way,
prices on the residual world market become highly
volatile.
Table 3. Qualitative importance of different factors.
2006–2008
impact
likely future
impact
the international
macroeconomic
environment
positive uncertain
demand for food crops as
biofuel feedstocks
positive but
small
positive
futures market speculation positive positive
climate change minimal uncertain
price transmission minimal small
inventory levels positive small
underinvestment in
agriculture
positive but
small
positive
exchange rate variability positive small
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is that while domestic markets might experience a
degree of greater stability as a result of intervention,
the impact on the world market and more open
countries is that volatility increases. Such beggar-
your-neighbour policies often arise when world
markets are in decline or in periods of great instability.
This was the situation in the rice market in 2007–2008
and characterized the world sugar market through
much of the 1970s and 1980s. In these cases, we
need to balance the advantage of reduced volatility in
the protected markets against the costs of increased
volatility for countries dependent on the residual
free market.
Longer term policies and responses are more sys-
tematic and expansive in what they try to achieve. At
the aggregate level, economies have sought to work
collectively to limit ﬂuctuations in world prices of
commodities, an approach manifest in the inter-
national commodity agreements that dominated the
1960s and 1970s for a range of commodities including
sugar, coffee and cocoa. Control in these markets
came via a combination of buffer stocks (cocoa) and
quota limitation of exports (coffee and sugar) with
the aim of maintaining prices within target bands
agreed between consumer and producer nations. The
historical experience indicates that export controls
are politically difﬁcult and cannot easily accommodate
the arrival of new producers while buffer stock agree-
ments are costly and vulnerable to speculative attack.
Gilbert (1996) argued that the cocoa and sugar agree-
ments achieved little success in their objectives, in the
case of cocoa because of lack of adequate ﬁnancing
and in that of sugar because of political problems in
relation to the Cuban export quota. The coffee agree-
ment did, however, both raise and stabilize prices and
the ending of controls in 1989 resulted in both lower
prices and greater volatility.
Coffee market controls lapsed because of a dimin-
ished enthusiasm for their enforcement. As the
largest coffee-consuming country, the United States
saw less interest in supporting the export revenues of
its Latin American allies in the post-Cold War
period. Brazil, which remains the largest coffee-
producing country, had seen its market share eroded
by higher cost African producers as the result of
export restrictions and, having grown to become the
second most important coffee-consuming country,
had come to have mixed views on the beneﬁts of
high prices (Gilbert 1996). Arguably, if controls had
been maintained in 1989, the agreement would have
been unable to accommodate the arrival of Vietnam
as a major new exporter in the 1990s since this
would have required existing exporters to cede
export quotas. With the lapse of controls, Vietnamese
exports displaced higher cost African production,
allowing Brazil to increase its market share.
There have been calls for a return to a more
regulated food trade environment as a means of com-
bating some of the effects of world price instability. It
is hard, however, to envisage that the current world
order would countenance such a move, particularly
in a trading environment dominated by multinational
trade negotiations designed to create more free trading
conditions and which seek to open up markets rather
than close them down.
Buffer stock intervention raises different issues.
There is a widespread view, discussed in §3, that low
levels of grain stocks may have exacerbated food
price volatility over 2006–2008. If governments take
the view that the private sector is unwilling or unable
to hold adequate stocks, they may wish to augment
these through public stocks. These could be held
either nationally or through an international authority.
This policy direction is dangerous. First, public
stockholding discourages and crowds out private
stockholding (Miranda & Helmberger 1988) as the
private sector comes to rely on the availability of
subsidized public inventory. The second problem is
that any commitment to maintain prices within pre-
announced bands, as in the cocoa agreement, makes
the stockholding authority vulnerable to speculative
attack (Salant 1983). There is a case for public stock-
holding of food commodities in landlocked developing
countries that are largely isolated from world markets
and where the private sector is poorly represented.
This case is much weaker for developed countries
and in relation to the world market where it would be
preferable to provide improved incentives for private
stockholding. A possible mechanism is for an inter-
national agency to purchase grain futures contracts in
periods of excess supply so as to induce, and have
access to, larger inventories in subsequent years.
Alternative measures for stabilization of price came
in ex post policies such as the EU’s STABEX scheme
that focused less on prices per se but instead on
the impact volatility had on a country’s current
account balance. Under STABEX, payments were
made to those countries that experienced large current
account swings owing to increasing import bills or
indeed a collapse in export earnings owing to price
declines. However, such schemes were often viewed
as insensitive to speciﬁc country concerns and were
quite slow to respond to crises, with the consequence
that their impact was probably to amplify rather than
dampen the effects of price cycles. The successor
FLEX scheme is generally seen as ineffective as while
it sought to improve on the STABEX scheme, it still
appears to contain some of the constraints and rigid-
ities embodied in its predecessor. As Aiello (2009)
suggests, the FLEX scheme has been dogged by a
lack of ﬁnance to support its operation and also
delays in getting funding to those countries that meet
eligibility criteria.
In richer nations, agricultural policies have been
established often with an explicit target of price vola-
tility reduction, as seen in the original rationale for
the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). While
ostensibly more about raising farm incomes, as was
also the case in the US policy, the CAP did initially
attempt to manage prices for both producers and
consumers through elements of supply control.
Thus, quotas in sugar and milk, and trade restrictions
(import tariffs and export subsidies) sought to balance
consumption and production at ‘reasonable’ prices.
Much of the policy intervention in recent years (e.g.
the reforms under the Macsharry plans of 1992)
had been designed to curb the growing subsidization
Review. Food price volatility C. L. Gilbert & C. W. Morgan 3031
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2010)of exports onto world markets as EU production
outstripped EU consumption and as the EU came
under increasing pressure to negotiate a settlement in
the Uruguay round of the GATT talks. Thus, input
controls such as set-aside and variable levies were
phased out to meet this requirement, although the
recent WTO ruling on sugar has led to a reduction
in the use of export subsidies in that crop too,
which, when coupled with the more generic liberaliz-
ing of the EU policy, has led to a more limited
ability of the EU to isolate its internal market from
the global market.
Instead, greater attention is being paid to market-
based measures of price risk management (Morgan
2001). Insurance markets are well developed in most
rich nations and offer some cover for crop failure,
but not for price risk. Futures and options markets
instead provide a means to hedge price risk that is
far cheaper than the alternative use of forward con-
tracts and major exchanges in the USA, Britain and
increasingly India and China, which offer contracts
in a range of major commodities such as grains, soya
beans and other soft commodities like sugar, coffee
and cocoa. However, direct uptake by producers can
be limited (Pannel et al.2 0 0 7 )e v e nw h e nc o m m u n i -
cation is good, awareness of opportunities is high and
the advantages would appear strong. At the same
time, producers beneﬁt indirectly from the greater pri-
cing that futures-based risk management offers to
intermediaries such as grain elevator companies.
In cases where producers do not have such
conditions—in poorer nations—use of futures and
options markets becomes much more difﬁcult. A
World Bank-sponsored project—the International Task
Force for Commodity Risk Management (ITF)
2000—sought to explore ways to design intermediation
between producer nations and major commodity
exchanges so that the beneﬁts of hedging could be
opened to all. Dana & Gilbert (2008) review this experi-
ence and argue that the major impact is more likely
to be seen through the protection of supply chain
intermediaries than directly by the producers themselves.
The 2007–2008 food price spike has reawakened
interest in food security issues. Governments, whether
or not democratic, have found that they cannot afford
to leave these issues to the operation of the market.
Indeed, the perception on the part of the private
sector that governments are unable to commit to stay-
ing outside food issues makes it difﬁcult for private
traders to ensure adequate supply until government
has declared its own hand. In many developing
countries, the private sector makes insufﬁcient pre-
paration for food supply problems knowing that
government will in the end act, and government does
act, justifying the necessity to do so on the basis
of the inadequate actions of the private sector. The
question is therefore not whether governments
should ensure food security, but how they should do
so and how they should involve the private sector.
Over the past two decades, western governments
and multilateral agencies have emphasized trade over
national food reserves. Food reserves were seen as
expensive, inﬂexible and prone to generate corruption.
To the extent that supply shocks are uncorrelated
across countries, it is less costly to import to meet a
domestic shortfall. This advice worked well until
2007 when agricultural prices rose across the board.
However, in 2007–2008, exactly when many countries
needed to import additional food, they found prices
rising against them or, in the extreme case of rice, mar-
kets being closed, with the result that supplies were not
available at any price. Governments have drawn the
conclusion that the advice to rely on trade was incor-
rect and are now attempting to re-establish food
security stocks.
Concerns have been raised about the extent of
speculation, and there have been calls for tougher
regulation to ensure that supposedly destabilizing
speculative activity is controlled. Index-based specu-
lation in commodity futures was highlighted in §5a sa
contributory factor in recent food price volatility that
may have exacerbated the 2006–2008 food price spike.
— Speculation could be limited by increasing the
‘margin’ required from speculators, thereby
increasing their costs. However, this would also
limit market liquidity, making it more costly for
commercial traders to hedge their risk positions.
— Most exchanges already take steps to limit large
positions that may have a price-distorting impact.
These measures are commendable but tackle
price manipulation more than volatility.
— von Braun & Torero (2009) have proposed a ‘vir-
tual reserve’ system. They suggest that, in the
event that speculation drives grains futures prices
up to excessive levels, the agency could intervene
by selling grains futures—see also von Braun et al.
(2009). The mere knowledge of this possibility
may be sufﬁcient to limit speculative activity. How-
ever, lacking the beneﬁts of hindsight, it is very
difﬁcult to know whether a particular price level
is excessive. There is a clear danger that, instead
of discouraging speculation, misjudged interven-
tions may result in the transfer of taxpayers’
funds to speculators.
— The most straightforward, and least costly, means
of limiting speculation is through encouraging
greater transparency in relation to the market
situation and, in particular, to stock levels. A
number of agencies, in particular the FAO and
the International Grains Council, already contrib-
ute in this regard, but they are constrained by
the information provided to them by national
governments. The developed countries of Europe
and North America generally provide comprehen-
sive information, but this is not the case for all
developing countries, in particular China, which
are now major food producers and consumers.
Governments rightly value stability in the prices of
basic food commodities. The right balance of policy
will vary from commodity to commodity. Many
Asian rice-producing countries have long histories of
successful stabilization of domestic rice prices using a
combination of import and/or export levies and food
reserve stockpiles (Dawe 2007; Timmer 2010).H o w -
ever, it seems unlikely that this experience can easily
be generalized to the maize and wheat markets where
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and consumption. Furthermore, as we have already
noted in discussing the rice price spike, successful
domestic price stabilization can often be at the expense
of greater volatility in world rice prices, effectively
pushing the costs of any shortfall onto many of the
world’s poorest consumers.
8. CONCLUSIONS
There is a general tendency for commentators to assert
that food price volatility has increased over time—
however, the reverse appears to be true. Volatility has
jumped over the most recent years, but there have
also been periods of high volatility in the past and,
except in the important case of grains, the recent epi-
sode does not appear exceptional. It is therefore
possible to hope that volatility levels will drop back
to historical levels over the coming years.
Despite this, there are factors—global warming, oil
price volatility transmitted via biofuel demand, index
investment in futures markets—that may have led to
a permanent increase in volatility in particular in
grains prices. We cannot rule this possibility out, but
we see little evidence that substantiates these claims,
which we therefore regard as (perhaps reasonable)
conjecture and not fact. It is unhelpful, but neverthe-
less correct, to say that we need to wait for several
more years before ﬁrm conclusions will be possible.
This review has emphasized the exceptionality of
rice. Recent rice price volatility has been much greater
than historical experience would have suggested as
likely. To a considerable extent, perceptions of the
recent food price spike were driven by the difﬁculties
experienced in the rice market, and the dramatic
price increases that these engendered. Rice was, how-
ever, not typical of other markets and the rice
experience does not generalize. Low-income rice-
importing countries do urgently need to address their
food security problems, but the solutions to those pro-
blems will not necessarily be relevant to other food
commodity markets.
There are three areas in which it would be helpful to
have more research.
— Most discussion of climate change in relation to
food markets has rightly focused on possible
impacts on yields. There has been very little discus-
sion of the possible impact on yield variability.
— We have argued that the biofuel literature has not
shown clear links from biofuel production to food
prices and from oil price-induced variations in
the proﬁtability of biofuels to food price volatility.
— We have highlighted the extensive evidence demon-
strating interconnection of ﬁnancial and food
commodity markets as the result of speculative
activity. Nevertheless, this contention remains con-
troversial and, until the mechanisms are better
understood, the policy debate will remain confused.
We are grateful to the editors, two anonymous referees and to
DEFRA for comments on the initial draft. The views
expressed are, however, those of the authors and not of
DEFRA.
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